利用獎(jiǎng)金機(jī)制提高員工積極性
公司通常通過使用薪金、傭金和獎(jiǎng)金的組合來調(diào)動(dòng)銷售隊(duì)伍的積極性,接下來，小編給大家準(zhǔn)備了利用獎(jiǎng)金機(jī)制提高員工積極性,歡迎大家參考與借鑒。
利用獎(jiǎng)金機(jī)制提高員工積極性
Companies typically compensate their sales force by using some combination of salary, commission, and bonuses, but executives are often unsure of which incentives provide the best motivation. For example, should bonuses be tied to quotas or should they be given unconditionally? For a quota system, would it be better to use bonuses as a reward (giving them to those who meet or surpass their quotas) or as punishment (taking them away from those who fail to meet their quotas)?
公司通常通過使用薪金、傭金和獎(jiǎng)金的組合來調(diào)動(dòng)銷售隊(duì)伍的積極性，但高管往往不確定哪些激勵(lì)措施是最佳的。例如，獎(jiǎng)金應(yīng)與配額掛鉤還是應(yīng)無條件給予?就配額制度而言，使用獎(jiǎng)金作為獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)(給予滿足或超過配額的人)還是作為懲罰(將他們從那些不符合配額的人帶走)效果更好?
To investigate these questions, we conducted a randomized field experiment at a large Indian company that manufactures and sells consumer durable goods. The firm’s sales force consists of over 5,000 people who are responsible for selling multiple product lines, including water and air purifiers, vacuum cleaners, security systems, and ancillary services. In the experiment, conducted over a six-month period in four urban cities (Delhi, Bangalore, Mumbai, and Hyderabad), we assigned different weekly bonus schemes to 80 full-time salespeople. These bonuses were substantial, representing about 27% of the monthly wage of an average salesperson at this company, and they were awarded either conditionally, according to performance, or unconditionally.
為了調(diào)查這些問題，我們?cè)谟《纫患掖笮椭圃旌弯N售耐用消費(fèi)品的公司進(jìn)行了一項(xiàng)隨機(jī)實(shí)地實(shí)驗(yàn)。該公司的銷售團(tuán)隊(duì)有5000多人，負(fù)責(zé)銷售多種產(chǎn)品線，包括水、空氣凈化器、吸塵器、安全系統(tǒng)和輔助服務(wù)。我們?cè)谒膫€(gè)城市(德里，班加羅爾，孟買和海得拉巴)進(jìn)行了為期六個(gè)月的實(shí)驗(yàn)，對(duì)80名全職銷售人員實(shí)行不同的周獎(jiǎng)金計(jì)劃。 獎(jiǎng)金非常豐厚，約占該公司平均銷售人員月工資的27%，根據(jù)業(yè)績等條件獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)給銷售人員或者無條件獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)給員工。
We assigned the salespeople to different bonus treatment groups. Some received conditional bonuses, which we tied to sales quotas under three different treatments: standard, punitive, and real-punitive. In the standard treatment, we gave a bonus payment after a salesperson achieved a weekly sales quota that was set 20% higher than what that individual had previously sold. The punitive treatment was identical except for the framing: We told salespeople that failing to receive a bonus was a penalty for failing to achieve their quotas. And in the real-punitive treatment, bonuses were awarded at the start of the week but then withdrawn for those who didn’t meet their quotas.
我們根據(jù)不同的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)措施將銷售人員分成多個(gè)小組。有些采用有條件獎(jiǎng)金發(fā)放方式，我們以三種不同的方式將獎(jiǎng)金與銷售配額掛鉤：標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、懲罰和實(shí)際懲罰。在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)處理中，我們?cè)阡N售人員實(shí)現(xiàn)了每周銷售配額比(比個(gè)人上一階段銷售額高20%)后發(fā)放獎(jiǎng)金。 懲罰性處理的方式有些不同：我們告訴銷售人員，沒有獲得獎(jiǎng)金是對(duì)未能實(shí)現(xiàn)配額的懲罰。在實(shí)際處罰中，獎(jiǎng)金在本周開始時(shí)頒發(fā)，但是若銷售人員未能達(dá)到銷售配額，獎(jiǎng)金將被撤回。
Some people received unconditional bonuses, which were given irrespective of their sales performance. The goal was to encourage reciprocity, whereby salespeople would increase their work efforts in appreciation for the firm rewarding them with extra monetary compensation. These bonuses were awarded under two different treatments: delayed and immediate. In the delayed treatment the bonuses were communicated to the salespeople at the beginning of the week, and payment was made at the end of the week. In the immediate treatment salespeople were simultaneously informed of and awarded the bonus at the start of the week.
有些人獲得了無條件獎(jiǎng)金，不論銷售業(yè)績?nèi)绾味寄塬@得獎(jiǎng)金。這種機(jī)制的目標(biāo)是鼓勵(lì)互惠原則，銷售人員將更加努力地工作，以感謝企業(yè)為他們提供獎(jiǎng)金。 這些獎(jiǎng)金由兩種不同的方式發(fā)放：延遲發(fā)放和即時(shí)發(fā)放。延遲發(fā)放指的是，每周開始時(shí)告訴員工即將發(fā)放獎(jiǎng)金，但實(shí)際在一周結(jié)束時(shí)發(fā)放;即時(shí)發(fā)放則指銷售人員在每周開始時(shí)得到發(fā)放獎(jiǎng)金的通知、同時(shí)能夠領(lǐng)取獎(jiǎng)金。
Analyzing the resulting data, we found that the conditional bonuses were, on average, more than twice as effective as the unconditional bonuses. In fact, such conditional compensation resulted in a sales increase of approximately 24%. But, interestingly, we found little evidence of a difference between the standard and punitive treatments. This finding runs counter to loss-aversion theory, which stipulates that people’s desire to avoid a loss will be stronger than their desire to attain an equivalent gain. Our results also indicated that a conditional bonus could potentially demotivate salespeople over time: Salespeople’s performance was higher during weeks of a bonus treatment but lower in weeks after a bonus treatment. This result is consistent with past behavioral research that has found that too much extrinsic motivation may actually lead to a decrease in intrinsic motivation.
分析結(jié)果數(shù)據(jù)后，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)有條件獎(jiǎng)金的效果比無條件獎(jiǎng)金平均高出一倍多。實(shí)際上，有條件獎(jiǎng)金促使銷售額增加約24%，但有趣的是，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和懲罰性措施之間差異很小。 這一發(fā)現(xiàn)與損失規(guī)避理論背道而馳，這一理論認(rèn)為人們避免損失的愿望強(qiáng)于取得等價(jià)收益的愿望。我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)，有條件的獎(jiǎng)金可能會(huì)隨著時(shí)間推移降低銷售人員的積極性：銷售人員的表現(xiàn)在發(fā)放獎(jiǎng)金的幾周里比較好，但在獎(jiǎng)金發(fā)放后的幾周內(nèi)明顯下降。 這個(gè)結(jié)果與過去的行為研究一致，發(fā)現(xiàn)過多的外在動(dòng)機(jī)實(shí)際上可能導(dǎo)致內(nèi)在動(dòng)機(jī)的減少。
For the unconditional bonuses, we found that they were effective only when they were distributed as a delayed reward. Awarding salespeople with bonuses at the start of a sales period had no significant effect on their performance. It could be that, even though they were told otherwise, the salespeople considered the immediate bonus to be compensation for their past performance, instead of a reward for their future performance. Another interesting result was that the effectiveness of the delayed bonuses appeared to decay when such a reward scheme was repeated over time: The effect size became marginal toward the end of the field experiment.
就無條件獎(jiǎng)金而言，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)只有延遲發(fā)放時(shí)才能起到作用。在銷售期開始時(shí)授予銷售人員獎(jiǎng)金對(duì)其業(yè)績沒有顯著影響。原因可能是銷售人員認(rèn)為即時(shí)獎(jiǎng)金是為了獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)他們過去的業(yè)績，而非未來的業(yè)績。另一個(gè)有趣的發(fā)現(xiàn)是延遲獎(jiǎng)金的作用似乎會(huì)隨著使用次數(shù)的增加而減?。簩?shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)束時(shí)，這種獎(jiǎng)金的效果已經(jīng)趨近于零了。
We also investigated how the various types of bonuses might affect people differently. We found, for example, that the unconditional bonuses tended to be more effective for salespeople with a higher base performance, which supports the idea that high performers generally have more goodwill toward the company and thus are more likely to reciprocate by increasing their selling effort. In contrast, the conditional bonuses were equally effective across all types of performers.
我們還調(diào)查了各種類型獎(jiǎng)金對(duì)銷售人員的影響。例如，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，無條件獎(jiǎng)金往往對(duì)績效較高的銷售人員更為有效，這表明，高績效者普遍對(duì)公司有更多的善意，從而更有可能通過加倍努力來回報(bào)公司。 相比之下，有條件獎(jiǎng)金對(duì)所有員工的影響基本相同。
Our results have implications for companies trying to more effectively manage their salespeople. In general, sales force costs often represent the single largest investment for an organization, averaging about 10% of sales revenues, and up to 40% in B2B markets. As such, companies would do well to understand how best to motivate their salespeople, and to that end, judicious bonuses can be an effective tool.
我們的實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)果對(duì)于試圖更有效地管理銷售人員的公司有重要影響。一般來說，銷售人員成本通常是企業(yè)的最大投資，平均占銷售總收入的10%，而在B2B市場則高達(dá)40%。因此，公司會(huì)更好地了解如何最有效地激勵(lì)他們的銷售人員，明智的獎(jiǎng)金政策是一種有效的工具。
Sales force compensation is a tricky issue, requiring decisions based less on intuition and conventional “wisdom,” and more on hard, quantitative data. We encourage companies to periodically experiment with their compensation systems, as there is no clear-cut, magic rule for an optimal scheme. Firm and national culture are different, and so are people.
銷售隊(duì)伍的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)機(jī)制是一個(gè)復(fù)雜的問題，在進(jìn)行相關(guān)決策時(shí)應(yīng)避免過度依賴直覺，多參考量化數(shù)據(jù)。世上沒有魔法可以讓我們制定出完美的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)機(jī)制，所以企業(yè)應(yīng)該定期對(duì)自己的薪酬體系進(jìn)行檢測。公司和國家文化各不相同，人們也各有各的特點(diǎn)。
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