金融財經(jīng)閱讀：《應對人民幣崛起的中間道路》

　　IMF不應該為方便人民幣的加入而放寬規(guī)定。人民幣必須令人信服地滿足IMF的標準。如果延長現(xiàn)有貨幣籃子的有效期只是為了方便儲備管理者、而非給中國更多時間來實現(xiàn)達標，將受到人們的歡迎。下面學習啦小編為大家?guī)斫鹑谪斀?jīng)雙語閱讀：《應對人民幣崛起的中間道路》，希望大家喜歡!

　　The International Monetary Fund’s five-yearly review of which currencies should constitute its Special Drawing Rights may seem a dry technical exercise. But a great deal more hinges on the decision than the internal accounts of the Washington-based institution.

　　國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)每隔五年進行一次評估，決定其特別提款權(quán)(SDR)應由哪些貨幣構(gòu)成，這看起來或許一項枯燥的技術工作。但這一決定影響的不僅是這家總部設于華盛頓的機構(gòu)的內(nèi)部賬目，還有其他許多東西。

　　For the second time since 2010, the IMF is scheduled in November to raise or lower its thumb as to whether to include the renminbi along with the dollar, the yen, the euro and sterling in the basket of so-called SDR currencies. It is on the surface an arcane distinction. SDRs are a synthetic unit of account used by the IMF to allocate assets among member countries. They are neither used for international trade deals, nor does their existence preclude central banks from holding reserves in other widely circulated currencies.

　　IMF計劃于11月決定是否接納人民幣與美元、日元、歐元和英鎊一起構(gòu)成所謂的SDR貨幣籃子，這是IMF自2010年以來第二次面臨這一決定。表面上看這是一種神秘的榮譽。SDR是IMF使用的虛擬記賬單位，用于在各成員國之間分配資產(chǎn)。SDR既不能用于國際貿(mào)易協(xié)定，其存在也不會妨礙央行持有其他廣為流通的貨幣作為儲備資產(chǎn)。

　　What gives the application its political piquance is Beijing’s hunger to garland the RMB with the status of being an internationally-badged reserve currency. Indeed, so sensitive are the politics that great attention has been paid to an internal IMF report suggesting China might not meet the entry criteria, and proposing an extension to the existing basket until September 2016.

　　北京方面渴望讓人民幣成為帶有國際標識的儲備貨幣，這讓其加入SDR貨幣籃子的申請在政治上變得富有刺激性。事實上，政治上的極度敏感性，使得IMF的一份內(nèi)部報告受到極大關注。該報告間接指出，中國可能沒有達到被納入的標準，并提議將現(xiàn)有貨幣籃子的有效期延長到2016年9月。

　　Adding the “redback” to the basket would be a powerful piece of symbolism. It comes when Beijing is increasingly asserting its independence from the world’s financial architecture, establishing new regional organisations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank which it claims are more suited to meet local needs as well as having the less-bruited benefit of being more amenable to its influence.

　　將“紅幣”(即人民幣——譯者注)納入貨幣籃子將具有強大的象征意義。北京方面正以越來越大的力度彰顯自己相對這一全球金融架構(gòu)的獨立性，建立了亞洲基礎設施投資銀行(Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank，簡稱：亞投行)等新的區(qū)域金融組織。中國宣稱后者更適于滿足地區(qū)要求，當然還有一個較隱秘的好處是更容易左右。

　　China has visibly chafed at the governance of the existing institutions, complaining that they are insufficiently open to voices from the developing world. To be fair, some of the complaints are not without substance, not least those concerning voting rights in the Bretton Woods bodies. The risk is that rejecting its application for SDR status might deepen China’s estrangement from western institutions.

　　中國已明顯對現(xiàn)有國際金融機構(gòu)的治理感到不滿，抱怨它們沒有足夠的意愿接受發(fā)展中國家的意見。平心而論，某些抱怨也不是毫無根據(jù)，尤其是關于布雷頓森林(Bretton Woods)機構(gòu)的投票權(quán)問題。拒絕中國對SDR地位的申請存在著風險，即有可能加深中國對西方機構(gòu)的疏遠。

　　There are plenty of reasons not to wish a further fracturing of the global financial system. Of course the IMF should not bend the rules to ease Chinese entry. The RMB must credibly meet the IMF’s criteria. It is to be welcomed that the basket extension is only to aid reserve managers, and not to give Beijing more time to fulfil the criteria.

　　人們有很多理由希望全球金融體系避免進一步分裂。當然，IMF不應該為方便人民幣的加入而放寬規(guī)定。人民幣必須令人信服地滿足IMF的標準。如果延長現(xiàn)有貨幣籃子的有效期只是為了方便儲備管理者、而非給中國更多時間來實現(xiàn)達標，將受到人們的歡迎。

　　China is in any case not far from meeting the requirements. It is already a major currency for trade and investment. The government has eased capital controls and liberalised financial markets. One particular bugbear was removed in May when the IMF declared that China’s currency was no longer undervalued relative to the dollar to which it has been loosely pegged.

　　不管怎樣，中國距離滿足這些要求并不遙遠。人民幣已是貿(mào)易和投資的主要貨幣。中國政府已經(jīng)放寬了資本管制，開放了金融市場。IMF今年5月宣布人民幣相對其松散掛鉤的美元已不再被低估，為中國除去一個巨大的心病。

　　Two concerns do still raise doubts. One is whether the RMB meets the criteria laid down obliging it to be “freely usable”. Requirements such as the need for China to increase foreign access to markets and further open its capital account may have been hampered by the spectacle of Beijing’s Sisyphean attempts to buoy a slumping stock market over the last two months.

　　有兩個問題仍引起疑慮。一個問題是，人民幣是否符合能夠“自由使用”的標準。一些要求——比如中國需要擴大外資的市場準入范圍并進一步開放資本賬戶——的實現(xiàn)，可能已受到北京方面過去兩個月“西西弗斯式”救市壯舉的阻礙。

　　Aside from the question of eligibility, the IMF must also wrestle with the diplomatic consequences from a potential rearrangement of the top table. Were China to be inducted it would need a weighting in the SDR basket commensurate with its trading heft, giving it a whopping 13 per cent against the 6.7 per cent currently held by Japan.

　　除了資格問題，IMF還必須設法應對未來領導權(quán)重新調(diào)整帶來的外交后果。如果人民幣正式加入的話，中國將需要在SDR貨幣籃子中得到與其貿(mào)易體量相稱的權(quán)重，這將使其權(quán)重高達13%，而日本當前所占權(quán)重只有6.7%。

　　China’s SDR accession is not a done deal. But whatever the monetary cards turn up in November, the direction is clear. China should get its financial governance in order, while the developed world must adjust and grow comfortable with a rising financial power.

　　人民幣是否能加入SDR貨幣籃子還沒有定論。但無論11月的投票結(jié)果如何，方向都是明確的。中國應理順本國的金融治理，而發(fā)達國家必須調(diào)整并逐步適應一個崛起中的金融強國。